Stock price bubbles are often on productive assets and occur in a sector of the economy. In addition, their occurence is often accompanied with credit booms. Incorporating these features, we provide a two-sector endogenous growth model with credit-driven stock price bubbles. Bubbles have a credit easing e¤ect by relaxing collateral constraints and improving investment e¢ ciency. Sectoral bubbles also have a capital reallocation e¤ect in the sense that bubbles in a sector attract more capital to be allocated to that sector. Their impact on economic growth depends on the interplay between these two e¤ects.
What causes asset price bubbles? What is the impact of such bubbles on the economy? How should policymakers respond to bubbles? While these general questions are central to macroeconomics, this paper aims to study the following speci…c question: How do bubbles a¤ect long-run economic growth?
To address this question, we focus on a particular type of bubbles, the credit-driven bubbles, that have three important features. 1 First, bubbles are often accompanied with an expansion in credit following …nancial liberalization. The Japanese asset price bubble in the 1980s and China's stock market bubbles are examples. Another example is the recent US housing bubble.
With this type of bubbles, the following chain of events is typical as described by Mishkin (2008) : Optimistic beliefs about economic prospects raise the values of some assets. The rise in asset values encourages further lending against these assets and hence more investment in the assets. The rise in investment in turn raises asset values. This positive feedback loop can generate a bubble, and the bubble can cause the credit standards to ease as lenders become less concerned about the ability of borrowers to repay loans and instead rely on further rise of the asset values to shield themselves from losses. Second, bubbles have real e¤ects and a¤ect market fundamentals. Take a stock price bubble as an example. The bubble in stock prices encourages more lending against the …rms' assets and hence raises investment. The rise in investment raises capital accumulation and dividends.
Third, bubbles often appear in a particular sector or industry of the economy. For example, the China, Japan, and US housing bubbles all occurred in the real estate sector. The Roaring Twenties bubble and the internet bubble were based on speculation about the development of new technologies. The 1920s saw the widespread introduction of an amazing range of technological innovations including radio, automobiles, aviation and the deployment of electric power grid. The 1990s was the decade when internet and e-commerce technologies emerged.
Incorporating the above features, we build a two-sector endogenous growth model with credit-driven stock price bubbles. We assume that the capital goods produced in one of the two sectors has a positive externality e¤ect on the productivity of workers. This externality e¤ect provides the growth engine of the economy, similar to that discussed by Arrow (1962) , Sheshinski (1967) , and Romer (1986) . Unlike these models, we assume that …nancial markets are imperfect. In particular, …rms in the two sectors face credit constraints in a way similar to that in Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2004) , Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Jermann and Quadrini (2011) . In order to borrow from lenders, …rms must pledge a fraction of their assets as collateral. In the event of default, lenders capture the collateralized assets and operate the …rm with these assets. The loan repayment cannot exceed the stock market value of the …rm with these assets. Otherwise, …rms may take loans and walk away. The lenders then lose the loan repayment, but recover the smaller market value of the collateralized assets. When the collateral constraint is su¢ ciently tight, …rms have an incentive to in ‡ate their asset values so as to relax the collateral constraints. We call this e¤ect of bubbles the credit easing e¤ect. If lenders have optimistic beliefs about asset values and lend more to the …rms, then …rms can make more investment and raise their asset values. This positive feedback loop can support a bubble.
The credit easing e¤ect of bubbles encourages investment and saving and hence enhances economic growth. In our two-sector model economy, bubbles have an additional capital reallocation e¤ect: Bubbles in only one of the sectors attract more investment to that sector and may distort capital allocation between the two sectors. More speci…cally, if bubbles occur only in the sector that has positive externality, then bubbles partly correct the externality ine¢ ciency and still enhance economic growth.
On the other hand, if bubbles occur only in the sector with no externality, then more capital is attracted to the sector that does not induce growth. The strength of this negative e¤ect depends on the elasticity of substitution between the two types of capital goods produced in the two sectors. When the elasticity is large, the negative capital reallocation e¤ect dominates the positive credit easing e¤ect and hence bubbles retard growth. But when the elasticity is small, then an opposite result holds.
Our paper is closely related to the literature on the impact of bubbles on endogenous economic growth. Important studies include Saint-Paul (1992) , Grossman and Yanagawa (1993) , King and Ferguson (1993) , Olivier (2000) , and Hirano and Yanagawa (2010) . The …rst three studies extend the overlapping generations model of Samuelson (1958) , Diamond (1965) , and Tirole (1985) to economies with endogenous growth due to externalities in capital accumulation. In their models, bubbles crowd out investment and reduce the growth rate of the economy. Using a similar model, Olivier (2000) shows that their results depend crucially on the assumption that bubbles are on unproductive assets. If bubbles are tied to R&D …rms, then bubbles may enhance economic growth.
Unlike the preceding studies, Hirano and Yanagawa (2010) study bubbles in an in…nitehorizon endogenous growth AK model with …nancial frictions. In their model, bubbles are on intrinsically useless assets, 2 and can be used to relax collateral constraints. They introduce investment heterogeneity and show that when the degree of pledgeability is relatively low, bubbles enhance growth. But when the degree of pledgeability is relatively high, bubbles retard growth.
Our paper is also related to the literature on bubbles in production economies with exogenous growth. 3 Closely related studies include Caballero, Farhi, and Hammour (2006), Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2006) , Kocherlakota (2009), Farhi and Tirole (2010) , Wang and Wen (2010) , Ventura (2011a, 2011b) , and Miao and Wang (2011) . Caballero, Farhi, and Hammour (2006) introduce capital adjustment costs to the Diamond-Tirole model and study the episodes of speculative growth. Other studies focus on the e¤ects of bubbles in the presence of …nancial frictions. Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2006) and Farhi and Tirole (2010) show that bubbles can provide liquidity and crowd investment in. Kocherlakota (2009) , Martin and Ventura (2011a) , and Miao and Wang (2011) show that bubbles can relax collateral constraints and improve investment e¢ ciency. Miao and Wang (2011) provide a theory of credit-driven bubble that has the …rst two features discussed earlier.
Our paper builds on Miao and Wang (2011) and di¤ers from previous studies in two major respects. First, bubbles in our model are attached to productive assets, rather than on intrinsically useless assets or assets with exogenous dividends. Second, our model economy features two sectors. Bubbles may occur in only one of the two sectors and attract too much capital to be allocated to that sector. Thus, sectoral bubbles have a capital reallocation e¤ect, which may be detrimental to economic growth.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. Section 3 provides equilibrium characterizations. Section 4 studies the symmetric bubbly equilibrium in which bubbles occur in both sectors of the economy. Section 5 studies the asymmetric bubbly equilibrium in which bubbles occur in only one of the two sectors. Section 6 concludes.
Technical proofs are collected in an appendix.
The Model
We consider a two-sector economy which consists of households, …nal goods producers, capital goods producers, and …nancial intermediaries. Time is continuous and the horizon is in…nite.
There is no aggregate uncertainty.
Households
There is a continuum of identical households with a unit mass. Each household derives utility from a consumption stream fC t g according to the following function:
where > 0 is the subjective rate of time preference. Households supply labor inelastically. The labor supply is normalized to one. Households earn labor income, trade …rm stocks, and make deposits to …nancial intermediaries (or banks). Financial intermediaries use deposits to make loans and earn zero pro…ts. The net supply of any stock is normalized to one. Let r t denote the interest rate. Because there is no aggregate uncertainty, the interest rate is equal to the rate of return on each stock. From the households'optimization problem, we can immediately derive the following …rst-order condition:
(1)
Final Goods Producers
There is a continuum of identical …nal goods producers with a unit mass. Each …nal goods producer hires labor and rents two types of capital goods to produce output according to the following production function:
where k it denotes the stock of type i = 1; 2 capital goods rented by a …nal goods producer, N t denotes hired labor, K it is the aggregate stock of type i capital, 2 (0; 1) represents the capital share, A represents total factor productivity, > 0 represents the elasticity of substitution between the two types of capital, and ! 2 (0; 1) is a share parameter.
According to the speci…cation of the production function in (2), type 1 capital goods have positive externality to the productivity of workers in individual …rms, in the manner suggested by Arrow (1962) , Sheshinski (1967) and Romer (1986) . Unlike these studies, we di¤erentiate between the two types of capital goods and assume that only one of them has positive externality. Intuitively, knowledge has a positive spillover e¤ect. Knowledge is created and transmitted through human capital. Compared to human capital, it is more reasonable to assume that physical capital has no externality to the productivity of workers. We may view sector 1 as the sector producing human capital such as the education sector and view sector 2 as the manufacturing sector.
We adopt a functional form with constant elasticity of substitution between the two types of capital. When the elasticity ! 1; the production function approaches the Cobb-Douglas form.
We will show later that the substitutability between the two types of capital has important implications for the impact of bubbles in the two sectors on economic growth.
Final goods producers behave competitively. Each …nal goods producer solves the following problem:
where w t denotes the wage rate, and R it denotes the rental rate of type i capital, i = 1; 2: The …rst-order conditions are given by:
Capital Goods Producers
The two types of capital goods are produced in two sectors, respectively. Each sector has a continuum of ex ante identical capital goods producers with a unit mass. They are heterogeneous ex post because they face idiosyncratic investment opportunities. As in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997 , 2005 , each …rm meets an investment opportunity with probability dt from time t to t + dt. With probability 1 dt; no investment opportunity arrives. This assumption captures …rm-level investment lumpiness and generates ex post …rm heterogeneity. As will be shown below, it is also useful for Tobin's marginal Q to be greater than 1 in equilibrium.
Assume that the arrival of investment opportunities is independent across …rms and over time.
We write the law of motion for capital of …rm j in sector i between time t and t + dt as:
where > 0 is the depreciation rate of capital and I j it is the investment level. Each …rm's objective is to maximize its stock market value. Let V it (K j it ) be the value function, which represents the stock market value of …rm j in sector i when its capital stock is K j it : Then it satis…es the asset pricing equation:
subject to the law of motion (7) and two additional constraints. These two constraints re ‡ect …nancial frictions. The …rst constraint is given by:
where L j it represents bank loans. This constraint states that …rms use internal funds R it K j it and bank loans L j it to …nance investment. We assume that …rms do not raise new equity. This assumption re ‡ects the fact that equity …nance is more costly than debt …nance. For analytical tractability, we consider loans without interest payments as in Jermann and Quadrini (2010) .
Incorporating loans with interests would make loan volume become a state variable, which complicates the analysis of a …rm's optimization problem. See Miao and Wang (2011) for an analysis of the model with one-period debt with interests in a discrete time framework.
The second constraint is the collateral constraint given by:
where 2 (0; 1) : For simplicity, we assume that all …rms in the economy face the same degree of pledgeability, represented by the parameter . 4 This parameter represents the degree of …nancial frictions. The motivation for this collateral constraint is similar to that in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) . In order to borrow from a bank, …rm j must pledge a fraction of its assets as collateral or e¤ectively pledge the stock market value of the …rm with assets K j it as collateral. 5 The bank never allows the loan repayment L j it to exceed the stock market value V it ( K j it ) of the pledged assets. If this condition is violated, then …rm j may take loans L j it and walk away, leaving the collateralized asset K j it behind. In this case, the bank operates the …rm with the collateralized assets K j it and obtains the smaller …rm value V it ( K j it ); which is the collateral value.
The collateral constraint in (10) may be interpreted as an incentive constraint in an optimal contract when the borrowers have limited commitment: 6 Firm j may default on debt. If it happens, then the …rm and the bank renegotiate the loan repayment. In addition, the bank reorganizes the …rm. Because of default costs, the bank can only seize a fraction of existing capital K j it : Alternatively, we may interpret as an e¢ ciency parameter in that the bank may not be able to e¢ ciently use the …rm's assets K j it : The bank can run the …rm with these assets and obtains …rm value V it ( K j it ). Or it can sell these assets to a third party at the goingconcern value V it ( K j it ) if the third party can run the …rm using assets K j it . This value is the threat value to the bank. Following Jermann and Quadrini (2010) , we assume that the …rm has all the bargaining power in the renegotiation and the bank gets only the threat value.
The key di¤erence between our modeling and theirs is that the threat value to the bank is the going concern value in our model, while Jermann and Quadrini (2010) assume that the bank liquidates the …rm's assets and obtains the liquidation value in the even of default. 7 Enforcement requires that the value (to the …rm) of not defaulting is not smaller than the value of defaulting, that is,
4 As will be analyzed below, this assumption also allows us to isolate the distortional e¤ect on capital allocation across the two sectors caused by sectoral bubbles from that caused by di¤erent degrees of pledgeability. 5 Alternatively, we may assume that the …rm pledges a fraction of the stock market value of the …rm, Vit K j it ; as collateral. The collateral value is Vit K j it : This modeling does not change our key insights. See Martin and Ventura (2011a,b) for related credit constraints. 6 See Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2004) and Alvarez and Jermann (2000) for related contracting problems. 7 U.S. Bankruptcy law has recognized the need to preserve going concern value when reorganizing businesses in order to maximize recoveries by creditors and shareholders (see 11 U.S.C. §1101 et seq.). Bankruptcy laws seek to preserve going concern value whenever possible by promoting the reorganization, rather than the liquidation, of businesses. This incentive constraint is equivalent to the collateral constraint in (10).
Note that the modeling of the collateral constraint in (10) follows from Miao and Wang (2011) who also provide a detailed discussion of the optimal contract. It is di¤erent from that in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) :
where Q it represents the shadow price of capital produced in sector i. The expression Q it K j it is the shadow value of the collateralized assets or the liquidation value. 8 This form of collateral constraint rules out bubbles. By contrast, according to (10), we allow the collateralized assets are valued in the stock market as the going-concern value when the new owner can use these assets to run the reorganized …rm after default. If both …rms and lenders believe that …rms'assets may be overvalued due to stock market bubbles, then these bubbles will relax the collateral constraint, which provides a positive feedback loop mechanism..
Competitive Equilibrium
Let
To write equations (13), (14), and (15), we have imposed the market-clearing conditions k it = K it and N t = 1 in equations (5), (6), and (2).
Equilibrium Characterization
In this section, we …rst analyze a single …rm's decision problem. We then conduct aggregation and characterize equilibrium by a system of di¤erential equations. Finally, we study the balanced growth path in the bubbleless equilibrium.
A Single Firm' s Decision Problem
We take the interest rate r t and rental rates R 1t and R 2t as given and study a capital goods producer's decision problem (8) subject to (9) and (10). We conjecture that the value function takes the following form:
where Q it and B it are to be determined variables. We interpret Q it as the shadow price of capital, or marginal Q following Hayashi (1982) . We will show below that both B it = 0 and B it > 0 may be part of the equilibrium solution because the the …rm's dynamic programming problem does not give a contraction mapping. We interpret B it > 0 as the bubble component of the asset value. We will refer to the equilibrium with B it = 0 for all t as the bubbleless equilibrium and to the equilibrium with B it > 0 as the bubbly equilibrium.
a result similar to that in Hayashi (1982) . In this case, the collateral constraint (10) becomes (12), a form used in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) . When B it > 0; the collateral constraint becomes:
Thus, …rm j can use the bubble B it to raise the collateral value and relax the collateral constraint. In this way, …rm j can make more investment and raise the market value of its assets.
We call this e¤ect of bubbles the credit easing e¤ect. If lenders believe that …rm j's assets have high a value possibly because of the existence of bubbles and if lenders decide to lend more to …rm j; then …rm j can borrow more and invest more, thereby making its assets indeed more valuable. This process is self-ful…lling and a bubble may sustain.
The following proposition characterizes the solution to a …rm's optimization problem.
Proposition 1 Suppose Q it > 1: Then (i) the market value of the …rm is given by (16); (ii) optimal investment is given by
and (iii) (B it ; Q it ) satisfy the following di¤ erential equations:
and the transversality condition:
Investment decisions are described by the Q theory (Tobin (1969) and Hayashi (1982) ).
In the absence of adjustment costs, when Q it > 1, …rms make investment and the optimal investment level reaches the upper bound given in (9). In addition, the collateral constraint in (10) or (17) is binding. We then obtain equation (18). Equation (19) (20) is an asset pricing equation for the bubble B it > 0: We may rewrite it as
It states that the rate of return on the bubble r t is equal to the rate of capital gains _ B it =B it plus dividend yields (Q it 1) : The dividend yields come from the fact that a dollar of the bubble allows the …rm to make one more dollar of investment and raises …rm value by (Q it 1) :
Because investment opportunities arrive at the rate ; the average bene…t is equal to (Q it 1) :
Most models in the literature study bubbles on intrinsically useless assets. In this case, the return on the bubble is equal to the capital gain. Thus, the growth rate of the bubble is equal to the interest rate. As a result, the transversality condition (21) will rule out bubbles. In our model, bubbles are on productive assets and their growth rate is less than the interest rate.
Thus, they cannot be ruled out by the transversality condition. As Santos and Woodford (1997) point out, it is very hard to generate bubbles in an in…nite horizon economy. It is possible to generate bubbles in overlapping-generations models when the economy is dynamically ine¢ cient (see Tirole (1985) ).
Equilibrium System
We can use the decision rule described in Proposition 1 to easily conduct aggregation and derive equilibrium conditions.
Proposition 2 Suppose Q it > 1: Then the equilibrium dynamics for (B it ; Q it ; K it ; I it ; C t ; Y t ) satisfy the following system of di¤ erential equations:
together with (15), (19)- (20), and the transversality condition:
where R 1t and R 2t satisfy (13) and (14), respectively, and r t satis…es (1).
We shall focus on the long-run steady-state equilibrium in which a long-run balanced growth path exists. We will not study transitional dynamics. In a balanced growth path, all variables grow at possibly di¤erent constant rates. In particular, the growth rates of some variables may be zero.
The condition Q it > 1 enables us to apply Proposition 1. This condition is generally hard to verify because Q it is an endogenous variable. We will show below that Q it is constant along the balanced growth path. We shall impose assumptions on the primitive parameters such that Q it > 1 on the balanced growth path.
Bubbleless Equilibrium
We start by analyzing the bubbleless equilibrium in which B it = 0 for all t: On a balanced growth path, consumption grows at the constant rate. By the resource constraint (15), aggregate capital, aggregate investment, and output all grow at the same rate. By equation (1), the interest rate r t must be constant.
To determine the endogenous growth rate, we need to derive the investment rule. As we show in Proposition 1, if Q it > 1; then both the investment constraint (9) and the collateral constraint (12) will bind. Intuitively, this case will happen when the collateral constraint is su¢ ciently tight or is su¢ ciently small. When is su¢ ciently large, then …rms will have enough funds to …nance investment and the collateral constraint will not bind. In this case, …rms e¤ectively do not face …nancial frictions and Q it = 1.
Speci…cally, in the case without …nancial frictions, we can show that
and
De…ning K t = K 1t + K 2t , we then obtain
on the balanced growth path. Equation (27) or (28) gives the capital allocation rule across the two sectors under perfect …nancial markets. 9 Using equation (28), we can also derive aggregate output on the balanced growth path:
Because aggregate output is linear in the aggregate capital stock, our two-sector endogenous growth model without …nancial frictions is isomorphic to a one-sector AK model. We denote the economic growth rate by g 0 : Because of externality in the decentralized economy, this growth rate is still less than that in an economy in which a social planner makes the consumption and investment decisions.
We denote the economic growth rate by g for the case of binding collateral constraints.
By equations (23) and (24), we obtain:
if Q it > 1: Thus, R it + Q it must be constant. In the appendix, we will show that R 1t = R 2t = R and Q 1t = Q 2t = Q for some constant Q : By equations (13) and (14), equations (27) and 9 Note that this allocation rule is not socially e¢ cient because private …rms do not internalize the externality e¤ect from sector 1.
(28) still hold. In addition, equation (29) also holds. Thus, collateral constraints do not distort capital allocation between the two sectors. The reason is that we have assumed that the two sectors face identical collateral constraints (i.e., identical ). If the pledgeability parameter were di¤erent across the two sectors, then the capital allocation between the two sectors would be distorted due to …nancial frictions. Our model isolates this e¤ect from the distortion caused by sectoral bubbles.
Next, we rewrite equation (19) on the balanced growth path:
Substituting r = g + using (1), R = A; and equation (30) into equation (31), we can solve for Q :
and the long-run growth rate g : We summarize the above analysis in the following result:
then consumption, capital, and output on the balanced growth path grow at the rate
Condition (33) is a technical condition that ensures g 0 > 0: Condition (34) says that if capital goods producers can pledge su¢ cient assets as collateral or is su¢ ciently large, then the collateral constraints are so loose that they are never binding. In this case, capital goods producers can achieve investment e¢ ciency in that Q it = 1 for i = 1; 2: However, …nal goods producers cannot achieve investment e¢ ciency because they do not internalize the externality from the aggregate capital stock in sector 1. We then obtain the familiar growth rate g 0 as in the standard AK model of learning by doing without …nancial frictions. This rate is smaller than the …rst-best socially optimal growth rate, (A ) :
Condition (36) ensures that Q > 1 so that we can apply Propositions 1-2. From conditions (34) and (36), we observe that the arrival rate must be su¢ ciently small for Q > 1 and hence …nancial frictions matter. Condition (37) is a technical condition that ensures g > 0:
These two conditions are equivalent to
One can show that condition (33) makes the two inequalities possible.
To understand the intuition behind the determinant of growth, we add up equations in (23) for i = 1; 2 and notice that on the balanced growth path aggregate capital grows at a constant rate g: We then obtain
where s = (I 1t + I 2t ) =Y t is the aggregate investment rate or the aggregate saving rate. Both the aggregate saving rate and the output-capital ratio are constant along a balanced growth path. They are the key determinants of long-run growth.
In the bubbleless equilibrium, we have shown that Y t = AK t so that the output-capital ratio is equal to A: By equation (38), the aggregate saving rate s is equal to ( + ) = ( + ) :
Now we can understand that the growth rate g in the bubbleless equilibrium depends on the parameters A; ; and and the impact of these parameters on g is qualitatively identical
to that in the standard AK models of learning by doing (e.g., Romer (1986) ). In our model with collateral constraint and investment frictions, two new parameters and also a¤ect the growth rate g : We can easily show that g increases with : Intuitively, the economy will grow faster if more …rms have investment opportunities or if individual …rms meet investment opportunities more frequently. We can also show that g increases with : The intuition is that an increase in relaxes the collateral constraints, thereby enhancing investment e¢ ciency and raising the investment rate. The parameter may proxy for the extent of …nancial development.
An implication of Proposition 3 is that economies with more developed …nancial markets grow faster.
Symmetric Bubbly Equilibrium
In this section, we study symmetric bubbly equilibrium in which B it > 0 for some t for i = 1; 2:
Let consumption C t grow at the constant rate g b on the balanced growth path. By (1), the interest rate r t is constant on the balanced growth path and is equal to
In addition, by equations (15), (23), and (24), K it ; I it ; Y t ; and B it all grow at the same rate g b on the balance growth. In this case, equation (20) becomes:
Thus, on the balance growth path, the capital price Q it is constant for i = 1; 2. We denote this constant by Q b : It follows from the above two equations that
This equation shows that Q b > 1 so that we can apply Propositions 1-2 on the balanced growth path. On the balanced growth path, equation (19) becomes:
Thus, R 1t and R 2t are equal to the same constant, denoted by R b .
As in Section 3.3, we can show that the allocation rule under perfect …nancial markets given in (28) holds on the balanced growth path. Consequently, the rental rates are given by:
and aggregate output is given by Y t = AK t :
The above analysis demonstrates that the presence of bubbles in both sectors does not distort capital allocation across the two sectors. This result depends on the fact that the two sectors face the same degree of …nancial frictions as described by the identical parameter : If the two sectors faced di¤erent values of ; then it follows from equation (43) that the factor prices R 1t and R 2t in the two sectors would be di¤erent. As a result, capital allocation across the two sectors will be distorted in that equation (28) will not hold.
Isolating the capital allocation e¤ect of bubbles, we …nd that the role of bubbles is to relax the collateral constraints and to improve investment e¢ ciency. In addition, equations (23) and
(24) imply that on the balanced growth path,
Thus, the presence of bubbles B it =K it > 0 enhances economic growth.
Proposition 4 Suppose condition (37) and the following condition hold:
Then, on the balanced growth path, (i) both the bubbleless equilibrium and the symmetric bubbly equilibrium exist; (ii) the economic growth rate in the symmetric bubbly equilibrium is given by:
and (iii) g < g b < g 0 :
Condition (46) ensures that bubbles are positive, B it =K it > 0: Note that this condition implies condition (36) also holds. Under the additional condition (37), we deduce that the steady-state bubbleless equilibrium also exists. We can also show that g b > g > 0: The intuition behind this result is as follows. Since bubbles in the two sectors relax the collateral constraints and raise the aggregate investment rate or the saving rate, the growth rate in the symmetric bubbly equilibrium is higher than that in the bubbleless equilibrium. However, it is still smaller than the growth rate in the economy without the collateral constraints. The reason is that the collateral constraints in the presence of bubbles are not su¢ ciently loose.
They are still binding and cause investment ine¢ ciency.
Asymmetric bubbly Equilibrium
In this section, we study asymmetric bubbly equilibrium in which bubbles appear in only one of the two sectors. Recall that only capital goods produced in sector 1 have positive externality to produce …nal output. Because capital goods produced in the two sectors have a di¤erent role in the economy, bubbles in one of the two sectors may have di¤erent impact on economic growth than bubbles in the other sector.
Bubble in the Sector with Externality
We …rst consider asymmetric bubbly equilibrium in which B 1t > 0 and B 2t = 0 for all t. On the balanced growth path, consumption, capital, investment, output, and bubbles should grow at the same rate. Denote this rate by g 1b : By equations (1) and (20), we obtain:
Thus, the interest rate r t and the capital price Q 1t in sector 1 are constants, denoted by r and Q 1 respectively. The above two equations imply that:
Using equation (19), we deduce that on the balanced growth path,
Thus, the rental rate R 1t for type 1 capital is equal to a constant, denoted by R 1 : Substituting equation (48) and (50) into equation (51) yields:
Next, we derive the rental rate and the capital price in sector 2. We use equations (13)- (14) to show that:
Plugging this equation and R 1t = R 1 into equation (13), we obtain:
Thus, R 2t must be equal to a constant, denoted by R 2 : We will show below that R 1 is not equal to R 2 in the asymmetric bubbly equilibrium, unlike in the symmetric bubbly equilibrium. As a result, capital allocation across the two sectors is distorted. We call this e¤ect of bubbles the capital reallocation e¤ect. As revealed by equation (53), the strength of the capital reallocation e¤ect depends crucially on the elasticity of substitution parameter :
On the balanced growth path, equations (23) and (24) imply that
Thus, Q 2t is also equal to a constant, denoted by Q 2 : Using equation (19) and (48), we obtain:
Combining equations (56)-(57) and eliminating g 1b yields:
Substituting this equation into (56) yields:
Substituting equations (52) and (59) into (54) yields a nonlinear equation for g 1b : We also need to solve for the bubble to capital ratio, B 1t =K 1t > 0; using equation (55). The following proposition summarizes the result.
Proposition 5 Suppose that there exists a unique solution (R 1 ; R 2 ; g 1b ) to the system of equations (52), (54) and (59). 10 Suppose that:
Then the steady-state asymmetric bubbly equilibrium with B 1t > 0 and B 2t = 0 exists and the economic growth rate is g 1b .
We can use equations (58)-(59) and condition (60) to check that Q 2 > 1. Since Q 1 > 1 by (50), our use of Propositions 1-2 in deriving Proposition 5 is justi…ed.
Condition (60) guarantees the existence of B 1t =K 1t > 0: Given this condition, we can use equations (52) and (59) to show that R 1 < R 2 : Intuitively, the existence of bubbles in sector 1 relaxes the collateral constraints for …rms in that sector, thereby attracting more investment in sector 1. As a result, capital moves more to sector 1 instead of sector 2, causing the factor price in sector 1 to be smaller than that in sector 2, i.e., R 1 < R 2 :
Bubble in the Sector without Externality
Now, we consider the asymmetric bubbly equilibrium in which B 1t = 0 and B 2t > 0 for all t:
We use g 2b to denote the common growth rate of consumption, capital, investment, output, and the bubble in sector 2. We can follow a similar analysis to that in the previous subsection to derive the following proposition. We omit its proof.
Proposition 6 Suppose that there exists a unique solution (R 1 ; R 2 ; g 2b ) to the following system of equations:
together with (54). Suppose that
Then the steady-state asymmetric bubbly equilibrium with B 1t = 0 and B 2t > 0 exists and the economic growth rate is g 2b .
Condition (63) ensures that B 2t =K 2t > 0: It also implies that R 2 < R 1 : The intuition is that the existence of bubbles in sector 2 attracts more capital to move from sector 1 to sector 2.
Do Bubbles Enhance or Retard Growth?
In Proposition 4, we have shown that the presence of bubbles in the two sectors enhances longrun growth. The intuition is that bubbles relax collateral constraints and improve investment e¢ ciency. We have called this e¤ect the credit easing e¤ect. In the last two subsections, we have shown that the presence of bubbles in only one of the two sectors has an additional capital reallocation e¤ect: It causes capital allocation between the two sectors to be distorted, relative to that in a bubbleless equilibrium. Bubbles in one sector attract more investment to that sector, causing more accumulation of capital in that sector. Intuitively, if the capital stock in that sector has a positive spillover e¤ect on the economy, bubbles in that sector will enhance growth. On the other hand, if bubbles appear only in the sector without a positive spillover e¤ect, then they may retard growth. The preceding capital reallocation e¤ect depends on the substitutability between the two types of capital goods. If the elasticity of substitution between the two types of capital goods is large, then the reallocation e¤ect will be large. The following proposition formalizes the above intuition.
Proposition 7 Suppose that the conditions in Propositions 3(ii) and 4-6 hold. (i) If > 1 1 , then g 2b < g < g b < g 1b :
(ii) If 0 < < 1 1 ; then g < g 1b < g b and g < g 2b < g b :
To understand this proposition, we de…ne = K 1t =K t and use the expression for Y t in equation (15) to derive the capital-output ratio as
Plugging this equation into (39) reveals that the aggregate saving rate s and the share of type 1 capital goods are important determinants of the economic growth rate. The impact of bubbles on the economic growth rate is through these two variables. In particular, the credit easing e¤ect relaxes the collateral constraints and raises the aggregate saving rate s. The capital reallocation e¤ect in ‡uences capital allocation between the two sectors represented by and hence the output-capital ratio.
In both the bubbleless and the symmetric bubbly equilibria, we have shown that = !:
Thus, symmetric bubbles do not have a capital reallocation e¤ect. As shown in Proposition 4, these bubbles raise the aggregate saving rate s and hence g b > g :
Asymmetric bubbles have a capital reallocation e¤ect, causing 6 = !: When bubbles appear in sector 1 only, we have shown in Section 5.1 that > !: Since type 1 capital has a positive externality e¤ect, more capital allocation to Sector 1 raises the output-capital ratio. Thus, the capital reallocation e¤ect enhances economic growth. However, since only sector 1 has bubbles, the credit easing e¤ect will be smaller than that for the case of symmetric bubbles. The capital reallocation e¤ect can be strong enough to more than o¤set the weaker credit easing e¤ect if the elasticity of substitution between the two types of capital goods is large enough. This explains why g b < g 1b for > 1 1 .
On the hand side, if the elasticity of substitution is small, the capital reallocation e¤ect can not o¤set the weaker credit easing e¤ect so that g b > g 1b for < 1 1 . In the borderline case with = 1 1 ; the positive capital reallocation e¤ect fully o¤sets the weaker credit easing e¤ect so that g b = g 1b . Now consider the case in which bubbles appear only in sector 2. In this case, the credit easing e¤ect is weaker than that in the case where bubbles appear in both sectors. In addition, capital is reallocated toward the less productive sector 2. Hence the capital reallocation e¤ect is negative. The overall e¤ects make g 2b < g b .
Compared to the bubbleless equilibrium, bubbles in sector 2 have a positive credit easing e¤ect and a negative capital reallocation e¤ect. When the elasticity of substitution between the two types of capital goods is large enough ( > 1 1 ); the negative capital reallocation e¤ect dominates the positive credit easing e¤ect so that g 2b < g . On the other hand, when < 1 1 , the negative capital reallocation e¤ect is dominated so that g 2b > g . In the borderline case with = 1 1 , the two e¤ects fully o¤set each other so that g 2b = g .
Finally, we provide some numerical examples to illustrate Proposition 7. We set the parameter values as follows: = 0:01 which implies annualized interest rate equal to 4%; = 1=3, which implies labor share is 2/3; = 0:025; and A = 0:135. These parameter values suggest that the growth rate g 0 in the model without …nancial frictions is equal to 4%. The additional parameters are set as = 0:2; ! = 0:1 and = 0:1. These parameter values imply that the bubbleless growth rate g = 2:6% and the growth rate with symmetrical bubbles is g b = 3:3%. Figure 1 : The e¤ect of substitutability on growth with asymmetric bubbles Figure 1 plots g 1b and g 2b against di¤erent values of . This …gure reveals that g 1b increases with and g 2b decreases with . Interestingly, if is large enough, g 1b can be greater than g 0 = 4%: The intuition is that even without credit constraints, capital in sector 1 is underinvested because of the externality. Bubbles in sector 1 can partially correct such a distortion by attracting more resources to that sector if the substitutability between the two types of capital is large enough.
Conclusion
In this paper, we provide a two-sector endogenous growth model with credit-driven stock price bubbles. These bubbles are on productive assets and occur in either one or two sectors of the economy. In addition, their occurrence is often accompanied with credit booms. Endogenous growth is driven by the positive externality e¤ect of one type of capital goods on the productivity of workers. We show that bubbles have a credit easing e¤ect by relaxing collateral constraints and improving investment e¢ ciency. Sectoral bubbles also have a capital reallocation e¤ect in that bubbles in one sector attracts more capital to be allocated to that sector. Their impact on economic growth depends on the interplay between these two e¤ects. If the elasticity of substitution between the two types of capital goods is relatively large, then the capital reallocation e¤ect dominates the credit easing e¤ect. In this case, the existence of bubbles in the sector that does not generate externality will reduce long-run growth. If the elasticity is relatively small, then an opposite result holds. Bubbles may occur in the other sector that generates positive externality or in both sectors. In these cases, the existence of bubbles enhances economic growth.
In actual economies, bubbles eventually burst. Miao and Wang (2011) analyze the consequence of bubble bursting, using a one-sector model without endogenous growth. They show that the collapse of bubbles leads to a recession and moves the economy from a "good"equilibrium to a "bad"one. The present paper does not analyze this issue because this requires us to study the transitional dynamics from the equilibrium with bubbles to the equilibrium without bubbles. This analysis is technically complex and is left for a future study. 11 Nonetheless, we may provide an informal discussion here. After the collapse of bubbles, the economy will move from the balanced growth path with bubbles to the balanced growth path without bubbles characterized in Proposition 3. By Proposition 7, we can deduce that the collapse of bubbles will reduce long-run growth, except for the case in which bubbles occur in the sector without externality and in which the elasticity of substitution is large.
What are the policy implications of our model? Bubbles have a credit easing e¤ect, which improves investment e¢ ciency. However, sectoral bubbles also have a capital reallocation effect. In addition, the collapse of bubbles tightens credit constraints and may reduce long-run economic growth. Thus, it is important to prevent the occurrence of bubbles in the …rst place, rather than to prick them after their occurrence. From Proposition 3, we know that if the credit condition is su¢ ciently good, then bubbles cannot exist. Thus, improving credit markets is crucial to prevent the occurrence of credit-driven bubbles. In addition, as Mishkin (2008) argues, a regulatory response could be appropriate to prevent feedback loops between bubbles and the credit system.
A Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: We write the Bellman equation for (8) as:
subject to (9) and (10). We use S it = (Q it ; B it ) to denote the aggregate state vector that is independent of the …rm-speci…c superscript j:
Substituting the conjectured form of the value function in (16) into the above Bellman equation, we obtain:
Given Q it > 1, the investment constraint (9) and the collateral constraint (10) bind. We then obtain equation (18). As a result, the Bellman equation becomes:
Matching coe¢ cients on K j it and other term not involving K j it on the two sides of the equation yields equations (19) and (20) 
Proof of Proposition 3:
We conjecture that (16) holds and set B it = 0 for all t and i = 1; 2:
Then equation (65) holds.
(i) We …rst suppose that the investment constraint (9) and the collateral constraint (17) do not bind. We then solve for the balanced growth rate g 0 and impose conditions on the primitives so that the supposition is veri…ed in equilibrium. Without …nancial frictions, Q it = 1 and equation (65) implies that R 1t = R 2t = r t + : Equating (13) We then obtain equation (35) . By equation (23),
Solving yields:
The investment constraint (9) and the collateral constraint (17) imply that
For this constraint not to bind on the balanced growth path, we must have A < A + :
We then obtain condition (34).
(ii) Suppose condition (36) holds. Then the investment and collateral constraints bind. We only need to show that R 1t = R 2t = R and Q 1t = Q 2t = Q > 1 along the balanced growth path. The rest of the proof follows from the analysis presented in Section 3.3. Equation (30) implies that ( Q it + R it ) is equal to the same constant for i = 1; 2: Denote this constant by x:
On the balanced growth path, equation (19) becomes:
Combing with equation Q it + R it = x; we can solve for Q it and R it :
Thus, Q it and R it are equal to some constants independent of t and i: Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4: Plugging equations (40), (42), and (44) into equation (43), we can derive the growth rate g b in (47): Substituting the expressions for Q b ; R b ; and g b in (42), (44), and (47), respectively, into equation (45) yields:
Condition (46) ensures that B it =K it > 0:
Using equations (47) and (38), we obtain:
It follows from condition (46) that g b > g : Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5: We need to show the existence of B 1t =K 1t > 0 using equation (55).
Comparing with equation (56), we only need to show that
Substituting the expressions in equations (50) and (52) for Q 1 and R 1 ; respectively, into the above inequality, we …nd that it is equivalent to (60). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6: The proof is similar to that for Proposition 5. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 7: (i) Suppose > 1= (1 ) > 1: We …rst show that g 1b > g b : For the asymmetric bubbly equilibrium with B 1t > 0 and B 2t = 0; we can show that R 1 < R 2 as discussed in Section 5.1. It follows from equation (54) that
By equation (47), g b and R b satisfy
Comparing with equation (52) and using R 1 > R b ; we deduce that g 1b > g b :
Next, we show that g 2b < g : For the asymmetric bubbly equilibrium with B 2t > 0 and B 1t = 0; we can follow a similar analysis to show that R 2 < R 1 < A: Using equation (61), we deduce that g 2b < A ( + ) + = g :
Proposition 3 shows that g < g b : Combining the above results, we obtain that g 2b < g < g b < g 1b :
(ii) Suppose that 0 < < 1= (1 ) : For the asymmetric bubbly equilibrium with B 1t > 0 and B 2t = 0; we know that R 1 < R 2 : It follows from equation (54) that
Following a similar argument in the analysis in case (i), we deduce that g 1b < g b :
We next show that g < g 1b : For the asymmetric bubbly equilibrium with B 1t > 0 and B 2t = 0; we plug equation (53) into equation (14) to derive
It follows from R 2 > R 1 that
Using equation (59), we can show that the growth rate g 1b and R 2 satisfy
Thus, we obtain that g < g 1b < g b :
Now, we consider the asymmetric bubbly equilibrium with B 2t > 0 and B 1t = 0: In this case, R 1 > R 2 . As before, we can show that R 1 > A: By equation (70), R 2 < A: Using equation (62), we can show that g 2b < A(1 + ) + + = g b :
Next, we show that g 2b > g : By equation (61), we deduce that g 2b = + ( + ) + R 1 > + ( + ) + A = g :
Thus, g < g 2b < g b :
(iii) From the above analysis, we can easily deduce the result when = 1= (1 ) in the proposition. Q.E.D.
